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In her rich, historically informed and empirically sophisticated book 
Outside Color, Chirimuuta does nothing less than defend a novel theory 
of color, a position that we might call “externalist adverbialism”.  
My plan is as follows. First I will address Chirimuuta’s objections to 
the standard views. Then I will raise a few questions about her own 
view.   
 
1.	Chirimuuta	against	standard	options:	colors	as	neither	“outside”	nor	“inside”		
 
The philosophical dispute over color has been a kind of oscillation be-
tween two approaches: realist views that locate color in the external 
world, and irrealist views that locate color “in the mind”. Chirimuuta 
holds that both sides of this traditional dichotomy are mistaken (p. 58, 
65).   
Let’s begin with her criticisms of realist theories, such as Byrne and 
Hilbert’s reflectance physicalism and Cohen’s relationism.  
Her main objection to these standard realist theories is that they 
have two big false commitments. She says that they are committed to a 
false “correspondence” picture of color experience (e. g. p. 119, p. 130), 
and to a false view that the representation of colors is independent of 
the representation of other properties (98-99).  
But I think this objection falls short. For one thing, I think that she 
is wrong in thinking that realism has these commitments. Roughly, a 
minimal version of realism just says that the colors are instantiated by 
physical objects, or something like that. So there are minimal forms of 
realism that don’t have the two commitments Chirimuuta criticizes 
(indeed, this is a point that she herself concedes at p. 119, fn. 24). 
What is her objection to such minimal versions?  
Now, as a matter of fact, most realists do in fact accept one of the 
ideas Chirimuuta criticizes, namely, the “correspondence” picture of 
color experience. She characterizes this as the view that “a perceptual 
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state is right if it is veridical – if it correctly corresponds to a state of 
affairs in the environment” (p. 109).1 Her contrasting view she calls 
pragmatism: a perceptual state is right if it is a useful guide to the envi-
ronment. 
But I didn’t really see what her objection was to the correspondence 
picture. Even if she is right that experiences can be evaluated with re-
spect to how useful they are in guiding behavior, it doesn’t follow that 
they can’t also be evaluated with respect to whether they are veridical 
or not. The pragmatic picture and the correspondence picture are com-
patible (a point also made by Cohen in NDPR).  
True, some philosophers – some naïve realists - reject the claim that 
experiences can be assessed for veridicality. But I think that this be-
cause they load too much theoretical bagged into the claim. When we 
are given examples of veridical and non-veridical experiences, we easily 
catch on. This suggests that this talk answers to a genuine, pre-
theoretical distinction (Pautz 2009, 489-490; Byrne 2016 makes the 
same point at p. 9).  
So, I question Chirimuuta’s main objections to the standard form 
of realism, such as Byrne and Hilbert reflectance physicalism and Co-
hen’s relationism. But I think her book does contain additional, inde-
pendent objections to these realist theories that do hit their target. I 
would like to highlight these objections for a moment.   
Byrne and Hilbert’s reflectance physicalism. Against this view, Chi-
rimuuta objects that “there are great dissimilarities between features of 
colors as we experience them, such as the structure of color experience, 
and what is know of SSRs” (46-7; also 64-65; 126-130). 
Suppose, for instance, that Jonathan says “blue is more like purple 
than green”. This is true. But it just seems false if these colors he is talk-
ing about are just identical reflectances of the types shown in the fig-
ure below (next page), because, as Byrne and Hilbert (2003, 13) con-
cede, “there is no obvious sense” in which the blue reflectance is more 
like the purple one than the green one. So it is hard to see how reflec-
tance physicalism preserves the truth of Jonathan’s claim.  
                                               
1 Actually, Chirimuuta’s formulation of the “correspondence view” is not en-
tirely clear to me. She sometimes (110-111) seems to have in mind a some-
what stronger thesis: not merely that experiences can be said to correspond to, 
or fail to correspond to, the environment, but also that the primary “function” 
or “biological goal” (126) of the visual system is to produce experiences that 
correspond to the environment. I am not sure I understand this thesis. Any-
way, I will stick to her initial, official formulation: “a perceptual state is right if 
it is veridical” (109).  
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Figure 1: Reflectances typical of a blue object, purple object, and a green. From MacAdam 1985.  
 
Chirimuuta notes (p. 127) that Byrne and Byrne and Hilbert (2003) 
Byrne and Hilbert (2003) have offered a reply. They suggest that they 
can after all accommodate the truth of Jonathan’s statement by hold-
ing that the semantic value of “x is more like y than z” in Jonathan’s 
mouth is the following relation:   
 
The hue-difference relation: λxλy(all x-objects and all y-
objects have some value of a common hue, namely be-
ing bluish, but y-objects have no value of this hue).    
 
This relation is satisfied by the above trio of reflectances, provided 
that all objects with either of the first two colors are bluish, while ob-
jects with the third one are not at all bluish.  
But Chirimuuta raises a problem, namely, that Byrne and Hilbert 
have no plausible theory of hue categories themselves that does not 
appeal to our neural responses to reflectances. This is a big issue (in-
deed Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 55 had addressed worry she is pointing 
to), but in the end I agree.  
I would like like to further support Chirimuuta’s rejection of Byrne 
and Hilbert’s account of color-similarity by noting another basic prob-
lem with it. Their account of color-similarity just isn’t general enough. 
To see this, consider some other trios of colors:  
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Now suppose that Jonathan says “every trio of colors on the page is 
such that the first is more like the second than third”. His statement is 
true. But it would be false if the semantic value of his resemblance 
predicate were Byrne and Hilbert’s hue-difference relation. That rela-
tion may be satisfied by the original trio <blue, purple, green>. But it is 
not satisfied by the two other trios, for all the colors in these other trios 
imply the same hue, namely being reddish.2   
Chirimuuta notes (62-3; 125) there is some hope that “an explana-
tion that refers to internal mechanisms is more likely to yield an un-
derstanding of color spaces than an explanation put exclusively in 
terms of external physical stimuli”, such as Byrne and Hilbert’s reflec-
tance-types.3 I agree. For instance, in a recent review, Conway (2013, p. 
7) writes: 
                                               
2 There is another point that shows that Byrne and Hilbert’s account is not 
general enough. Suppose Alex is involved in a psychophysical experiment in 
which he experiences two trios of qualities and is asked to make judgments 
about the resemblance orders of the members of the trios. As it happens, Alex 
experiences a trio of colors, and a trio of taste qualities, and in each case, the 
first member of each trio was clearly more like the second than the third. Now 
suppose that Jonathan, who has no idea what qualities Alex experienced, just 
guesses, “for every trio of qualities Alex experienced, the first was more like 
the second than the third”. Then his guess is true. But this means that here the 
semantic value of the resemblance predicate, “x is more like y than z”, which 
he uses to express his guess, cannot be the hue-difference relation, for obvi-
ously this relation cannot be satisfied by the trio of the colors and by the trio 
of the tastes Alex experienced. Instead, it must be a much more general, topic-
neutral resemblance relation, which can equally be satisfied by colors and 
tastes. To fully answer the problem of similarity, therefore, Byrne and Hilbert 
need to say what this more general relation is, and make it plausible that it is 
satisfied by certain trios of reflectance-types (e. g. those in Figure 1 above) as 
well as by certain trios chemical-types (those with which they identify taste 
qualities).   
3 Chirimuuta says that “the source of these troubles [e. g. the problem of color 
similarity for Byrne and Hilbert] is the correspondence-detection model” (p. 
129). I am not totally sure what she means by that. Does she mean that the 
problem would go away if only they rejected this model of color experience 
but kept their claim that colors themselves are reflectance-types? If so, I do not 
think this is right. For the problem is about accommodating the truth of our 
color-similarity judgments, such as Jonathan’s judgments in the examples used 
above. Even if we cannot sensibly ask whether or not our color experiences “cor-
respond to reality”, we can certainly ask whether our color-similarity judgments 
do. And the point is that these judgments do “correspond to reality” – they are 
true – but that Byrne and Hilbert’s reflectance view has trouble accommodat-
ing their truth.  
    Therefore, I think that Chirimuuta’s objection from color similarity to real-
ists like Byrne and Hilbert is quite separate from her objection based on their 
commitment to a “correspondence model” of color experience.  
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The present evidence, accumulated from several 
labs, suggests that . . . in [postreceptoral visual 
area] V4 [there is] a more uniform representation 
of color space that more directly maps the per-
ceptual color wheel, red–orange–yellow–green–
cyan–blue–purple–red.  
 
Cohen’s relationism. This might naturally suggest a version of Jona-
than Cohen’s color relationism according to which colors are fine-
grained response-dependent, relational properties of objects of the form: 
causing postreceptoral neural response N (realizing color experience E) in a 
visual system of precise kind V in precise viewing circumstances C. This view 
seems to have more promise in accommodating the kinds of facts Chi-
rimuuta points to about the structural features of colors (Cohen 2009, 
196-197). 
But Chirimuuta points out (p. 170) what I regard as one of the most 
serious problems with Jonathan’s relationism – one that is independent 
of her general worry that I questioned above that all forms of realism 
are committed to a false correspondence picture of color experience. 
We might call it the visual access problem. Suppose you look again at 
the color samples above. In some sense you represent, or are presented 
with, the colors in having your experience. They are visually accessible. 
But it is very hard to see how Cohen’s fine-grained relational properties 
might be represented or presented in experience. They are so fine-
grained they are hardly ever repeated. They are ecologically insignifi-
cant. Your current brain states certainly don’t have the function of in-
dicating these non-recurring, ecologically insignificant properties that 
involve the precise lighting conditions and the precise state of his visu-
al system. There seems to be no theory of visual representation that 
could explain how his visual system might represents them (see also 
Pautz (2010) and Byrne and Hilbert (2016, section 3.1) for develop-
ment of this problem for Cohen-style relationism).4 
                                               
4 Chirimuuta suggests (170, note 11) that relationists face this “access prob-
lem” only if they are “Russellian representationalists” who hold that we “visu-
ally represent” the colors. I disagree. On any view, we see or experience the col-
ors. They are present to us in some sense. They are visually accessible. (This 
very obvious claim should be distinguished from Johnston’s version of “Ac-
cess” which is much more loaded.) Even if relationists reject Russellian repre-
sentationalism, they ought to accept these truisms. But, in the most general 
terms, the visual access problem is simply that it is very hard to see how rela-
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So in the end I think Chirimuuta’s book contains problems that 
show that it is very hard to see how colors might be located outside the 
head, either as reflectance properties of objects or as Cohen-style rela-
tional properties of objects.  
Chirimuuta is also opposed to the other side of the dichotomy: 
theories that kick colors upstairs into he dustbin of the mind (in Arm-
strong’s phrase) and hold colors are instantiated “in the head”. If we 
set aside sense data, then this requires the bizarre view that colors are 
instantiated by our experiences themselves, or by neural processes in 
the head. H. H Price (1932, 127) called this the “colored brain theory” 
and called it “very singular”. As Chirimuuta notes, James McGilvray 
has a view like this. And C. L. Hardin gives some hints of accepting it. 
For instance, he writes that colors “betoken states of ourselves” (1987, 
p. 293).  
Chirimuuta thinks this view is false and I agree. But I wasn’t totally 
sure of her grounds for rejecting it. Here is why. As we will see shortly, 
she herself accepts exactly this view in cases of hallucinatory counter-
parts of veridical experiences. She writes (155) that in hallucinatory 
cases “color [H-color she calls it] is a property of the series of neural 
evens inside my brain”. If she thinks this view of hers of hallucination 
is not ruled out by the phenomenology of hallucination, and if she 
thinks that the phenomenology of hallucination and normal experi-
ence might be very similar, then how can she rule out that this view is 
true across the board?  
I will return to this issue later. 
 
2.	Chirimuuta’s	New	Theory	of	Color:	externalist-disjunctivist	adverbialism	
 
Chirimuuta thinks it is a mistake to locate colors in the external world, 
and it is also a mistake to locate them always in the head. I agree with 
her on this. But what is her own positive view?  
She defends a kind of middle position. Her own positive view is 
that, in non-hallucinatory cases, colors are properties of extended 
world-mind processes that span the outer-inner divide. Here is how she 
puts it:  
 
                                                                                                                       
tionists can accept such truisms. True, I put the problem in terms of “visual 
representation” because as it happens I accept a representational approach to 
color experience, but the problem is really more general than that. (In fact, I 
think that Chirimuuta faces a similar problem: see note 6 of these comments.) 
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“Colors are properties of perceptual interactions [or processes] 
involving a perceiver (P) endowed with a spectrally discrimi-
nating visual system (V) and a stimulates (S) with spectral 
contrast of the sort that can be exploited by V.” (140) 
 
So, suppose you look at the distant planet Pluto through a tele-
scope, and it looks grey. There is a five-minute long process starting 
with Pluto and ending with your brain state. Her view is that the grey-
ness is a property of that five-minute long process.  
As I just said, in hallucination cases, she takes a different view, 
namely that “color [H-color she calls it] is a property of the series of 
neural evens inside my brain” (p. 155). She also asserts that we can hal-
lucinate a H-color only if we have before experienced a replica color in 
a veridical interaction, though I am not sure what evidence she has for 
this and in fact it goes against experimental evidence (Billock and Tsou 
2010).  
She calls her view “adverbialism”. But whereas some adverbialists 
think that color experiences are always inner processes, her view is that 
they are extended processes that go from the object to the brain pro-
cess. In that sense, it is an externalist rather than internalist version of 
adverbialism.5 Since she gives a different account of hallucination, she 
also calls her view “disjunctivist” (156). So we can call her complete 
package “externalist disjunctivist adverbialism”.  
 
3.	What	is	Chirimuuta’s	argument	for	externalist-disjunctivist	adverbialism?		
 
But what is Chirimuuta’s argument for externalist disjunctivist adver-
bialism? As we have seen, she criticizes some of the standard views, but 
we also also need a positive argument for her proposal.  
Her main argument for her position is that “[her version of] adver-
bialism is uniquely position to articulate the Janus-facedness of color”.  
But I was a bit unclear of what she meant by the Janus-facedness of 
color. She provides a number of quotes: 
 
“The concept of human color vision involving both a 
subjective component and an objective one” (Mausfeld, 
quoted on p. 132) 
 
                                               
5 She calls it “act-object” adverbialism (p. 143, 153). I use the label “external-
ist” to mark this feature of her view.  
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“colors fall right on the boundary that we have drawn 
by bifurcating the world into the physical and the psy-
chological” (Mausfeld, quoted on p. 42) 
 
“color is neither purely subjective nor purely physical” 
(Hurlbert, quoted on p. 13) 
 
But I think that these quotes are not clear enough for us to get a 
clear picture from them of what Chirimuuta means by the Janus-faced 
puzzle of color.  
Chirimuuta’s own official gloss of “Janus-facedness” is that “a 
plethora of color phenomena demand [constitutive??, causal?? - AP] 
explanations that draw on physical, neurophysiological and phenom-
enal descriptions” (58). She also says it means that color has “inner re-
latedness and out-directedness”. But while she gives some idea of what 
she means by outer-directedness (50-51), I wasn’t entirely clear what 
she meant by inner relatedness. This term wasn’t clearly defined in the 
book. Does she perhaps mean that phenomenal internalism is true for 
the experience of color – that the experience of color supervenes on 
the intrinsic properties of the subject? 
Since I am not entirely clear on what Chirimuuta means by the Ja-
nus-faced character of color, I am a bit unclear on her argument from 
the Janus-faced character of color to her externalist-disjunctivist adver-
bialism.   
I do believe that there is a profound puzzle in the vicinity of Chi-
rimuuta’s remarks on the Janus-faced character of color. In my own 
work, I have been puzzled by the fact that standard experiences of sen-
sible qualities are both essentially externally-directed and internally-
dependent, in ways I will not go into here (Pautz 2010a, 349ff; 2010b, 
p. 36ff). But I am not sure whether Chirimuuta has in mind the same 
puzzle as the motivation for her externalist disjunctivist adverbialism.    
 
4.	Questions	about	Externalist-Disjunctivist	Adverbialism	
 
Finally, I turn to some questions I have about externalist-disjunctivist 
adverbialism.  
 
(1) Suppose you view a tomato. You experience a reddish quality. Here 
is an obvious phenomenological fact. It seems to you that this reddish 
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quality qualifies a round item. I will call this the color-shape datum, be-
cause the point is that color and shape seem to go together.  
I don’t see how Chirimuuta’s view accommodates the color-shape 
datum. On her view, the reddish quality is not a property of the round 
tomato but a property of your interaction with the tomato (173). That 
interaction is certainly not round. If all that is going on is that you are 
undergoing an interaction with a round object, where that shape-less 
interaction has the property of being reddish, then this is not enough 
to explain why it should seem to you that there is before you some-
thing that has the properties of being round and being reddish. 6  
To drive the point home, consider an analogy. Suppose I have a 
philosophical interaction with (kindly) Chris Hill that is difficult and 
lasts only five-minutes. This does not make it seem to me that there is 
something out there that is difficult, lasts only five-minutes long, and is 
Chris-Hill-shaped.  
The same issue arises for Chirimuuta’s theory of hallucination. 
When you undergo a neural process that has a reddish H-color, where 
that neural process is not round, why should this make it seem to you 
that there is a reddish and round thing before you?  
Let me make a clarification before proceeding. My color-shape da-
tum differs from all the phenomenological claims that Chirimuuta dis-
cusses in the book as potential problems for her view. It differs from 
the representationalist claim that color experiences have truth-
conditions (160). It differs from the claim that colors look like intrinsic 
non-relational properties (204). And it differs from the claim that col-
ors look like properties of external, physical objects (2010). The color-
shape datum is less “theoretical” than all these claims that Chirimuuta 
discusses. In fact, it is accommodated by a wide-range of theories of 
color and color experience. It is even accommodated by Cohen’s rela-
tionism, for on this view, colors are co-instantiated with shapes, and 
represented as such in experience. It is accommodated by the sense da-
                                               
6 In fact, Chirimuuta’s theory, as so far presented, also doesn’t explain an even 
more basic fact: that we experience colors at all, that is, that we are presented 
with them (see note 4 of these comments). For, on this view, colors are proper-
ties of our interactions with objects. But we do not experience all the proper-
ties of our interactions with objects.  For instance, if I look at the planet Pluto, 
the interaction or process leading from the planet to my neural processing 
lasts five minutes (since it takes that long for light to travel), but I do not experi-
ence this property of the interaction – it is not visually manifest to me. So some-
thing must be added to her theory in order to explain what it is that makes it 
the case that we experience some properties of such perceptual interactions 
(viz. their colors) but not others (e. g. their temporal length).  
 10 
tum view, for on this view the sense data we’re acquainted with literal-
ly have colors as well as shapes. (Their share their shape with the corre-
sponding physical objects, on a traditional Lockean version of the 
view.) Finally, it is accommodated by representationalism. 7  But, as we 
have seen, it is very hard to see how it is accommodated by Chi-
rimuuta’s externalist-disjunctivist adverbialism.     
I wonder whether Chirimuuta would deny the color-shape datum, 
or try to accommodate it. I myself think that denying would be prob-
lematic, so I will briefly address some ways in which she might try to 
accommodate it.  
First, Chirimuuta considers somehow combining externalist-
disjunctivism adverbialism with “Fregean” representationalism (169). 
But even if she were to accept Fregean representationalism, she would 
presumably retain her chief thesis of the book, namely that colors are 
properties of perceptual processes or interactions. So she would still 
face my problem of explaining the color-shape datum. She would still 
have to explain why, when you interact with an object that is round, a 
property of the interaction itself, namely redness, seems to go together 
with a property of the object of the interaction. There is nothing in Fre-
gean representationalism that might help Chirimuuta explain why this 
should happen.  
Second, Chirimuuta sometimes invokes Gestalt ideas to explain the 
phenomenology of color experience (205-210). But I don’t see how this 
helps with the specific problem I have raised. The standard Gestalt prin-
ciples – for instance, the law of good continuity or the law of proximity 
- just cannot explain what Chirimuuta needs to explain: that when you 
interact with an object that is round, a property of the interaction it-
self, namely redness, seems to go together with a property of the object 
of the interaction. Again, this is not generally true. If I have a philosoph-
ical interaction with Chris Hill that is difficult and lasts five-minutes, 
this does not make it seem to me that there is something out there that 
is difficult, lasts five-minutes long, and is Chris-Hill-shaped.  
Third, Chirimuuta could be a projectivist: color qualities are in fact 
properties of processes or interactions, but in experience we “project 
                                               
7 For instance, the combination of representationalism and a reflectance theo-
ry of color can easily explain the datum. You have a brain state that track, and 
represents, the shape round. You have another that tracks, and represents, the 
color red (a reflectance). When these states are combined in the right way in 
the brain, you represent the co-instantiation of red and round.  
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them” onto external regions. However, this is not a theory but a meta-
phor. How does this happen?  
 
(2) My second question is about just what Chirimuuta’s externalist ad-
verbialism comes to. I think it comes in two importantly different ver-
sions, and I am not sure what version Chirimuuta defends.  
On one version of Chirimuuta’s externalist adverbialism, all fea-
tures of the process starting with the object and ending with the brain 
state somehow jointly contribute to constituting or metaphysically 
grounding the color of the whole process. Call this the joint determi-
nation version of externalist disjunctivist adverbialism (p. 174, top). (A 
rough analogy would be the way in which all features of a painting ho-
listically determine the beauty of the painting. Another analogy: if I 
have a ten-minute long conversation with a friend, the early, middle 
and late parts of the conversation all determine whether it was overall 
enjoyable.) On another version, it is rather the case that it is only the 
brain state at the end that grounds the color of the process. Call this 
the brain-based version of externalist disjunctivist adverbialism.  
To illustrate, suppose you view a yellow banana. Now consider an 
inverted earth case. On inverted earth, bananas have the blue reflec-
tance profile. But on inverted earth, our twins naturally evolved invert-
ing lenses on their retina. So, on inverted earth, when your twin looks 
at a blue-light banana, it ends up producing in the same brain state 
that it produces in Jane.  Here’s a picture of these two “processes” or 
“interactions”: 
 
You:            Brain state B  <------- retina  <----  yellow-reflectance banana 
Twin You:   Brain state B  <----- lenses  <------- blue-reflectance banana 
 
Now, on the brain-based version of Chirimuuta’s view, your perceptual 
process and your twin’s perceptual processes are both yellow, since the 
end with the same brain state, even if they start with different spectral 
distributions.   
By contrast, on the joint-determination version of Chirimuuta’s view, 
while your perceptual process on viewing a banana is yellowish, your 
twin’s perceptual process has some other color, just because the initial part 
of the process is different and involves a different spectral distribution, even 
though your brain states are identical. (Compare: the same force, when 
combined with different forces, results in different resultant forces.)  
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I have three worries about the joint determination view. First, it vi-
olates phenomenal internalism for color experience, since Jane and 
twin Jane have the same postreceptoral brain state. But Chirimuuta 
hasn’t provided in the book strong evidence for denying phenomenal 
internalism. Second, given an arbitrary perceptual process, starting 
with the spectral distribution and ending with a brain state, what is the 
rule whereby one can calculate how these jointly determine the result-
ant color of the whole process? (Compare: there is a rule for determin-
ing resultant force from component forces.) Or more generally: how do 
the early (spectral) parts and later (e. g. neural) parts jointly determine 
the color of the whole process? Third, given “structural mismatch” 
point discussed before and illustrated in Figure 1, it is just hard to be-
lieve that the spectral properties that start off a perceptual process help 
at all to metaphysically determine the color of that process. It seems to 
me more reasonable to suppose that the brain state at the tail end of 
that process plays the lion’s share of the role in determining the color 
of the process.  
For these reasons, Chirimuuta might accept the brain based version 
of externalist disjunctivist adverbialism: it is only the neural state that 
is at the end of a perceptual process that grounds the color of the 
whole process.  
But then I am unclear what, on her view, is the explanatory role 
played by the early, external stages of the process involving the spec-
tral distribution. True, even on the brain-based version of her view, the 
early, external stages may be a causal role. Everyone accepts that. But, 
on the brain based version of her view, it is only the brain process that 
constitutively determines the color of the interaction, and hence the 
phenomenology of the color experience. On this view, the early, exter-
nal stages don’t play a stronger, constitutive role in determining color 
of the process, and hence the phenomenology of the color experience. 
So if she accepts the brain based version of her view, I am now unclear 
about how her externalist version of adverbialism importantly differs 
from the traditional, internalist variety.  
 
(3) My third and final question about externalist disjunctivist adverbi-
alism is related to this. Suppose you view a tomato. Then suppose your 
brain state is artificially duplicated in the absence of the tomato, so 
you have a tomato-like hallucination that is just like your veridical ex-
perience of the tomato. As we saw, on her view, in a hallucination case, 
“color [H-color she calls it] is a property of the series of neural evens 
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inside my brain” (p. 155). Now, in this hallucinatory case, since the 
early, external stages of the process are missing, they can’t play a role 
in determining the chromatic character of the hallucination.  
But then, on Chirimuuta’s theory, what role are the early, external 
stage playing in the veridical case? They don’t seem to be making a dif-
ference to the phenomenology.  
Further, I think her view faces a familiar “screening off” worry. Giv-
en that the H-color of your hallucination is an intrinsic property of the 
neural events in your brain, what she calls the “H-color” of the neural 
events in your head must be present in the veridical case too. But, in the 
veridical case, this would seem to “screen off” the earlier, external parts 
of the process in playing a role in determining the character of your 
experience.  
 
5.	Conclusion	
 
Let me sum up. I agree with Chirimuuta on some big issues. I agree 
that there is a puzzle in the vicinity of what she calls the Janus-faced 
character of color. The experience of color is externally-directed and 
internally-dependent, and this is hard to explain. I also agree with her 
that it is wrong to think that colors are always instantiated by objects 
outside the head, and it is also a mistake to think that they are always 
instantiated inside the head. But I have raised some questions about 
her alternative view that they are instantiated by big, world-mind pro-
cesses that span the outer-inner divide. In my view, all of these views 
may share a false presupposition: that colors are instantiated in the 
world at all.  
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